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figure was one effective test for cases which the Canadian Supreme
Court should hear.
It is submitted this subsection ought to be deleted. Section 38 (8)
affords ample protection to litigants who, in the opinion of the
highest court of their province, have a point of law which should be
adjudicated by the court of final appeal for our country. At the same
time it would eliminate this type of case and free our judges to con-
sider thornier points of law more deeply and expeditiously.
With regard to the main issue of the case-the balance of prob-
abilities has been entrenched in the Common law for years as the
test to be applied in civil matters,9 although our Canadian Supreme
Court did not finally settle it authoritatively until Hanes v. Wawanesa
Mutual Insurance Co.10 which is discussed elsewhere in this review.
The decision was a proper one and indeed could not have been
otherwise. The law is in a satisfactory state and it was left undisturbed
by this case. T.A.S.
i INTERPRETATION
Bogock Seed Co. Ltd. v. C.P.R. , C.N.R., [1963] S.C.R. 247.
In 1897 an agreement was entered into between the C.P.R.
and the Crown by which a subsidy was granted to the C.P.R. in re-
turn for an agreement to charge reduced rates for certain "grains"
on the C.P.R. lines. Certain specified grains were listed but no refer-
ence was made to rapeseed. The question on appeal was whether
rapeseed is a "grain" within the meaning of the Crow's Nest Pass
Act 1897 and therefore entitled to a reduced rate.
Martland J. delivering the judgment of the court agreed with
the Board in dismissing the appeal and holding that "grain" did not
include rapeseed. He distinguished the case of British Coal Corp. v.
The King [1935] A.C. 500 which held that "in interpreting a constitu-
ent or organic statute, . .. that construction most beneficial to the
widest possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted." That case
did not apply here because the purpose of the Act was to give effect
to an agreement between two parties who only contemplated the ef-
fecting of a reduction in rates then applicable or what both parties,
at that time, regarded as being grain. The rule followed in this case
was stated in Sharpe v. Wakefield [1889] 22 Cl. B.D. 239 at 242 by
Lord Esher who said "... the words of a statute must be construed as
they would have been the day after the statute was passed, unless some
9 Cooper v. Blade (1858) 6 H.L. Cas. 746; Doe dem Devine v. Wilson et al.
(1855) 10 Moo. P.C.C. 502; Clark v. King (1921) 61 S.CR. 608; Smit v. Smith
and Smedman [1952] 2 S.C.R. 312; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Schlett [1945]
S.C.R. 289; Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Couture [1954] S.C.R. 34.
10 [1963] S.C.R. 154.
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subsequent statute has declared that some other construction is to
be adopted or has altered the previous statute."
It was found here as a question of fact that rapeseed would not
have been considered a grain in 1897 in Canada. Whether it is a
"grain" today is another matter.
This was largely an academic question because the statute has
been revised since the commencement of this action and rapeseed
is specifically listed as a grain to receive rail reductions under the
Act. R.J.H.
J. PAPER
Foot v. Rawlings, [1963] S.C.R. 197.
In Foot v. Rawlings1 the court considered a case the facts of
which promised a discussion of the whole doctrine of consideration.
There, six promissory notes were sued upon. Four of these had
been made in 1952 and were payable on demand with interest at 8%.
The fifth made in 1956 was payable on May 1, 1957. The sixth was
payable on December 10, 1958, with interest at 6 %.
In a written agreement dated July 7, 1958, the plaintiff, payee
of the six notes, agreed to accept the sum of $300 per month provided
it was paid on the 16th of every month until the debt secured by
the first five notes was paid. Interest was reduced to 51%. The parties
agreed orally that payment of the sixth note should be postponed until
the terms of this agreement had been carried out.
According to the terms of the written agreement the defendant
was to give the plaintiff a series of six post-dated cheques from
time to time, each series to cover a period of six months. Should any of
the cheques be turned down by the bank the interest on the unpaid
indebtedness was to revert to 8% and the monthly payments would
revert to $400 per month.
The cheques for the period from July to December 1960 were
dated on the 18th instead of the 16th, apparently through inadvert-
ence. The plaintiff acknowledged receipt of these cheques and later
cashed five of them. The trial judge held that there had been a
default under the written agreement and directed that the plaintiff
recover the full amount of principal and interest outstanding on the
six promissory notes.
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed an appea 2
from this judgment. A majority of that court held that there was no
consideration for the agreement to forbear and alternatively, if there
was consideration, the defendant would be limited to a cross-action
for breach of the agreement. Davey, J.A. dissenting, said that the
1 [19631 S.C.R. 197.
2 (1962) 37 W.W.R. 289; 32 D.L.R. (2d) 320.
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